You wouldn’t suppose that Ronald Acuña Jr. may presumably have a greater season in 2024 than he simply did in 2023, as a result of all he did final 12 months was unanimously win the Nationwide League Most Precious Participant Award whereas placing up historical past’s first 40/70 season – and even when that final half was clearly aided by the brand new guidelines, it’s nonetheless 40/70. What might be higher than that?
It’s not precisely affordable to anticipate extra, nevertheless it may not be out of the query, both. Often, after we see gamers put up what looks like a profession season, it’s A) fueled by what seems to be a wave of fine luck on the proper time, or B) at such an out-of-character stage that it’s unattainable to ever repeat, or C) it’s at an age the place it’s extra probably that the participant’s finest days are behind them than forward of them.
However A) isn’t the case; it’s really the alternative. B) isn’t true both, as a result of whereas Acuña indisputably had a superb 12 months, it was actually solely the steals that had been wildly out of line together with his previous efficiency, and C) nicely, he solely simply turned 26 in December.
All that implies that it’s not onerous to surprise if 2023 was certainly one of various nice years, not the very best 12 months he’ll ever have. It’s a minimum of doable there’s extra in there, anyway. How would possibly we get there?
1) He didn’t profit from good luck. He may need underperformed.
What we imply by “good luck and probably over- or under-performing” may be discovered within the case of Cody Bellinger, who had a robust surface-level season (.307/.356/.525, a 133 OPS+), but one which comes with a complete lot of questions on sturdiness and repeatability given his below-average hard-hit price, in addition to different components.
No such questions exist for Acuña, who arguably ought to have gotten greater than he confirmed final 12 months. Acuña posted a .428 Weighted On-Base Common, or wOBA, final 12 months, second solely to Shohei Ohtani. (It’s like on-base share, if OBP counted extra-base hits as greater than singles.) However his anticipated wOBA, based mostly on Statcast estimates of his high quality of contact, was really .460, that means he was 32 factors quick in actuality. That’s the third-largest unfavorable hole of any certified hitter. In the event you desire batting common, it’s the identical thought: He hit .337, however posted an anticipated .357, based mostly on the standard of his contact.
(By comparability, Mookie Betts was estimated to have obtained nearly precisely what he earned, posting a .416 wOBA off a .407 anticipated wOBA, that means there was probably no good or poor fortune. You’ll be able to say the identical for Acuña’s Atlanta teammate Austin Riley, who had a .363 wOBA and a .365 anticipated wOBA. On the opposite aspect, Bellinger’s .370 precise mark far exceeded his .327 anticipated mark, which is a part of his sluggish market this winter.)
This doesn’t all the time and even typically simply imply “dangerous luck,” to be clear. Generally you hit a ball 118 mph to the hole and see {that a} rookie outfielder finds himself in the best place on the proper time.
Generally among the best defensive outfielders of the twenty first century exhibits you precisely why he’s earned that label.
And typically, you hit a ball that may have been out of 27 different parks in baseball, besides not the one you’re in that day – and so as to add insult to harm, you hit it so onerous and to one of many higher defensive left fielders within the sport that you find yourself with merely a single.
Whether or not that’s “dangerous luck” or “that’s baseball” is as much as you, as a result of it’s lengthy been widespread to say that it’ll all even out ultimately, and that’s not all the time true.
What’s true, nevertheless, is that 31 totally different instances final 12 months, Acuña hit a barrel – that’s a batted ball with the proper mixture of exit velocity and launch angle, the varieties which have a mean north of .500 and slugging above 1.500 – into an out. It wasn’t simply probably the most of 2023; it was probably the most barreled outs of any season since monitoring started in 2015.
9 instances final 12 months, he hit a ball farther than 390 toes that was both an out or a single, additionally probably the most in baseball. (For context, balls hit 390-plus are extra-base hits greater than 85% of the time.)
Now: Does any of this assure that he’ll get extra ends in 2024? No, after all not, and it’s not like he by no means benefited from any weakly hit bloops, both. A few of these barrels and 390-plus foot fly balls would have been out if he’d pulled them, fairly than despatched them to lifeless middle – like when he hit a blast in Colorado at a projected 416 toes that also grew to become an out.
However as nice as Acuña’s 1.012 OPS simply was, it’s not that out of character with the .989 OPS he put up from 2020-21. (We’re prepared to look previous the underwhelming 2022, when he was working his method again to hurry following his critical knee harm.) What it mainly comes right down to is that the underlying metrics let you know there may be extra there, versus Betts or Riley, who had neither good nor poor outcomes, or Bellinger, who may be due for a step again.
2) He can tighten up that protection.
This would possibly come as a shock given what number of spotlight clips there are of Acuña throwing out runners silly sufficient to check his cannon of a throwing arm, however the superior protection metrics didn’t look kindly upon his 2023 season. Statcast’s Fielding Run Worth had him as minus-4 runs, and Baseball Information Options’ Defensive Runs Saved stated minus-2 runs, and the explanations had been the identical. Take a look at the Statcast breakdown of how we bought to the minus-4:
That’s not simply and even primarily about errors; it’s about performs that ought to have been made that weren’t, like this or this or this or this:
Or this, despite the fact that he compensated with an excellent throw.
We present you these unfavorable performs to make a degree: This might be excellent news.
That’s as a result of this isn’t like asking a poor defender corresponding to Kyle Schwarber to enhance his fielding, as a result of that consequence appears unlikely given the abilities that Schwarber does and doesn’t have. This isn’t a couple of lack of velocity or talent that simply can’t be overcome, like in the event you had been to place a catcher within the outfield. Whereas Acuña’s velocity is certainly down from earlier than the knee harm – the place it was as soon as elite stage, it was within the sixty fifth percentile final 12 months – it is nonetheless above common. And a number of the performs he did not make had been fairly presumably partially about defending the knee in much less pressing conditions.
The defensive shortcomings aren’t a bodily limitation, which implies that they are not something that an immensely gifted younger participant could not be capable of restrict.
Think about this: If Acuña had managed to submit a merely common vary rating in 2023, his WAR would have gone from 8.3 to roughly 8.9. If he’d gotten to even barely above common, he’d be extra like 9.3 WAR. Above common may be an excessive amount of to ask, however common isn’t. Merely eliminating the balls misplaced within the solar or getting barely higher reads – we are saying this stuff as if they’re straightforward, clearly, which they don’t seem to be – would go a good distance towards an much more beneficial season.
3) He can have a greater success price on the bases.
One controversial facet of Acuña’s 2023 season was that despite the fact that he did steal 73 bases – which is simply so many bases! – he ranked solely sixth in FanGraphs’ baserunning worth metric, half as beneficial as Corbin Carroll. That’s as a result of whereas Acuña led the game in steals, he additionally had the second-most instances being caught as nicely, and one time being caught is extra damaging than one time being profitable is effective. (He was extra good than nice on baserunning performs not involving steal makes an attempt, as nicely.)
What to observe for right here is basically extra about second base than third, as a result of whereas the stat line will say “Acuña was 14-for-16 stealing third,” the reality is that he was not thrown out stealing third by a catcher even as soon as. (The 2 failed makes an attempt had been each when he was picked off by the pitcher.)
As an alternative, he was picked off first base 5 instances, which all go into the dozen instances he was thrown out on makes an attempt to swipe second base – the second-most within the Majors. Whereas it could be tempting to suppose that for a follow-up, Acuña ought to go into 2024 attempting to steal much more, the extra beneficial method could be to steal extra effectively, even when meaning fewer steals total.
Think about this: By simply the stolen base part of the baserunning metric, there was basically a three-way tie for first place. Acuña stole extra bases than Carroll or CJ Abrams, however take a look at the success price:
Nobody, clearly, could be upset if Acuña merely repeated the identical stolen base numbers, however buying and selling in just a few bases taken for fewer outs given up could be extra beneficial – particularly when you think about the standard of the batters who hit behind him within the Atlanta lineup.
As we stated, it’s not truthful to anticipate extra from Acuna. But it surely’s not unreasonable, both, based mostly on his age, expertise, and the season we simply noticed him produce. Apart from: We haven’t even thought of the repercussions of him bringing that left-handed swing right into a sport, both. There would possibly simply be extra we have not even seen but.
